The New York Times issued a rare apology for failing to rigorously investigate the rationale for the Iraq war. The editor's note admitted stark failures to verify information fed to reporters by those wishing to make the case for war. By not critically investigating claims of weapons of mass destruction, the Times validated the primary rationale for war, which has now been largely discredited. The Times and other major news organizations suppressed credible voices of dissent that should have been heard in 2002 and 2003 when the case for war was being made.
The paper reviewed its reporting and discovered a "pattern of misinformation" that it is continuing to investigate. This body blow comes at a time of unprecedented journalism crises and outright fraud committed by the most respected names in the business.
These reporting failures have been known for some time. A lengthy but clearly written feature by Michael Massing, titled Now They Tell Us (February 2004), argued eloquently that many of the big media companies systematically suppressed reliable dissenting views in the run-up to war:
Why didn't we learn more about these deceptions and concealments in the months when the administration was pressing its case for regime change—when, in short, it might have made a difference? ... Beginning in the summer of 2002, the "intelligence community" was rent by bitter disputes over how Bush officials were using the data on Iraq. Many journalists knew about this, yet few chose to write about it.
Massing writes that reporting was corrupted by the influence of the White House:
[The Bush administration] made it extremely difficult to do this kind of [investigative] work ... rewarding sympathetic reporters with leaks, background interviews, and seats on official flights ... freezing out reporters who didn't play along. In a city where access is all, few wanted to risk losing it.
Seymour Hersh of the New Yorker has been exposing the propaganda and deception for over a year now. See Who Lied to Whom (3/24/03), Selective Intelligence (5/5/03), The Stovepipe (10/20/03), and Behind the “Mushroom Cloud” (10/21/03).
Slate has also been debunking the Times Iraq coverage for over more than 14 months, asking in April 2003 whether the paper had "changed the rules of journalism." Slate called the Times' apology a "mini culpa" for its mealy-mouthed excuses.
Frontline has a well researched feature, Truth, War & Consequences, that examines the rationale for war and what went wrong -- and why truth is the first casualty of war.
The Times reporter responsible for much of the faulty coverage, Judith Miller, described her responsibility as a journalist:
My job isn't to assess the government's information and be an independent intelligence analyst myself. My job is to tell readers of The New York Times what the government thought about Iraq's arsenal.
When journalists see themselves as mouthpieces for the government instead of dogged and independent critics, our very freedom through informed democracy is at risk.
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| Don't Be Evil - restoring the public trust in business, politics and the media |
New York Times apologizes for bad Iraq news - 5/26/2004 11:20:00 PM
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Google and the wisdom of crowds - 5/24/2004 03:03:00 PM
There's an engaging (and brief) video interview with James Surowiecki who wrote The Wisdom of Crowds : How Collective Wisdom Shapes Business, Economies, Societies and Nations.
It's a central tenet of the Don't Be Evil site that open access to accurate information will improve how business, politics and the media function. The book argues that a group as a whole is smarter than the smartest individual people in the group. The book argues against the theme of Extraordinary Popular Delusions & the Madness of Crowds. The author cites the stock market as one example. Even though the market swings between the extremes of despair and mania, over time it's hard to beat the collective wisdom of the market. The author claims that a group estimating the number of jelly beans in a jar is usually within 2% of the correct answer, while it is unlikely that any individual will be that accurate. The over- and under-estimation of individuals cancels out, leaving a relatively accurate group consensus. Google uses a similar approach to discover the most relevant web sites for its search engine by allowing all sites in the index to "vote" on each page's relative value. Surowiecki argues that for a group to be effective, each individual must do their own research and arrive at their own opinions independently. Once people start "following the crowd," the "information cascades" will warp the ability of the group to reach a valid consensus. Surowiecki is a big proponent of the Google Dutch auction to place their IPO, because it relies on thousands of individuals doing their own research to determine the market price. Surowiecki believes this will result in a better price for Google, and a price closer to the actual market price of the stock post-IPO. So if you're an individual investor, Surowiecki advises to invest in index funds (boring), or try to discover areas where the market is just following the crowd and exploit the resulting price distortions. Surowiecki argues that today's polarized political environment is causing the presidential candidates to retreat to a small number of advisors instead of engaging the public with their proposals. Consequently, they will not benefit from the wisdom of the population, and are likely to make poor decisions when judged through the lens of history. |
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